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International remittances have been portrayed as the human face of globalization given 
their potential to alleviate poverty by directly increasing household income. Using a 
panel of rural households in Mexico from October 1998 to November 2000 this study 
assesses whether this is in fact the case. However, rather than examining whether 
transfers income would reduce future consumption poverty we asked if transfers are 
likely to reach people whose conditions are prone to worsen in the future. We used 
vulnerability to consumption poverty to quantify the extent to which risks and the more 
permanent disadvantages embedded in most rural livelihoods, can translate into future 
declines in well-being. We found, contrary to our expectations, a negative and 
statistically significant relationship between the remittance of transfers, including 
foreign remittances, and the threat to future poverty that rural households could 
experience.  
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1  Globalization, remittances, and poverty 
One of the most salient consequences of globalization has been the surge of remittances 
from developed to developing areas mediated through migratory processes. According 
to the World Bank’s Global Economic Prospects 2006, in 1990 workers’ remittances to 
middle and low income countries amounted to about US$31 billion. Fifteen years later, 
they are estimated to have reached US$167 billion. They have become a major source 
of financing for developing countries and are especially important in Latin America and 
the Caribbean (LAC), where they represent about 70 per cent of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and are five times larger than Official Development Assistance 
(Fajnzylber and López, 2007).  
In Mexico, migration to the United States has gained prominence during the last couple 
of decades leading to unprecedented flows of remittances to the extent that now the 
country tops the ranking of remittances in the world.1 Worker remittances have 
continued to exceed revenues from tourism since 1998. In 2005, tourism garnered 
US$8.5 billion, while remittances hovered around US$20 billion. Likewise, remittances 
have already surpassed FDI for the first time in the recent past. In 2005, remittances 
outperformed the US$19.7 billion sent in FDI. 
If remittances have become the human face of globalization as migrants commit 
portions of their income to help their households in the host and the home country 
(Orozco, 2002), then – the argument goes – given that they often go to poor households 
and directly increase these household’s level of income, they could become a massive 
 
          
Source: Bank of Mexico 
                                                 
1   Migration from Mexico to the United States has always been a double-edged sword. Some perceive 
the increasing flows of people as evidence of an increased interdependence between complementary 
economies in an era of economic integration while others interpret the same experience as a painful 
reminder of the exclusionary nature of the globalization friendly development model embraced by the 
country since the 1980s, which has forced many to the other side of the border.   2
resource transfer mechanism, able to bring down poverty levels.2 Following this logic it 
has become commonplace to assume that a higher and more regular reliance on foreign 
transfers represents an opportunity for agricultural households to become less 
vulnerable to poverty and risks.  
Nevertheless, those in more need are not always the ones that receive remittances 
(Goldstein et al., 2004), either because they go to better-off households or simply 
because not all poor households with social networks receive support during hardship. 
When there is no immediate need to cope with risks, the activation of remittances would 
also not necessarily be aligned to the needs faced by the recipient even if there is a 
permanent risk of staying poor or becoming poorer due to the household’s own 
structural characteristics, but rather depend on who is the net provider of insurance, 
relative risk preferences, and relative bargaining power (Lucas and Stark, 1985). 
According to Lucas and Stark (1985) when the migrant is a net provider and perceives 
no reason to continue doing so (i.e., if the recipient household is poorly endowed, has 
limited command over the migrant and thus weak negotiating power to maintain 
him/her in the contract) then he/she might be tempted to stop sending remittances. We 
therefore anticipate that the existence of national and transnational support networks 
cannot be taken for granted as an effective tool to mitigate poverty since their activation 
depends in part on the type of risks faced, the constraints imposed on the donor by its 
own circumstances and the presence of non-altruistic motivations.  
Based on these counter arguments we reconsider the presumption that transfers in rural 
areas reach the ‘right people’ from a poverty reduction perspective and ask whether 
transfers actually reach those rural households in Mexico whose conditions are likely to 
worsen in the future. We are tempted to consider this to be the case given that our group 
of households is located in extremely poor high risk agrarian communities with limited 
access to formal insurance mechanisms (García-Verdu, 2002) rendering more likely a 
system of wide reciprocity extending beyond the family.3 
We consider the relationship between poverty and remittances within a dynamic context 
that takes into account the impact that risk-induced fluctuations and other more 
permanent disadvantages at the household and community level can have on the future 
welfare status of households (as assessed through consumption) and the subsequent 
implications this could have for the mobilization of transfers. Households can send 
money because we assume implicitly that their members, including the permanent 
                                                 
2   This argument has led to perceive remittances as one of the factors behind the recent drop in poverty 
rates in Mexico (Lanjouw, 1998; Székely and Rascón, 2005) and other LAC. According to the World 
Bank’s  Development Impact of Remittances in Latin America report world cross-country and 
microbased estimates indicate that, on average, an increase in one per cent point in the ratio of 
remittances to GDP would be associated with a decline in poverty of about 0.4 per cent (Fajnzylber 
and López, 2007). In a similar vein, a recent study by the same institution on south-eastern Mexico 
(Wodon et al., 2002) attributed a two point reduction in the income poverty rates of Guerrero and 
Oaxaca to local and foreign remittances by a pure income transfer effect, an impact of similar scope to 
that of the public transfer programmes Procampo and Oportunidades (Progresa).  
3   In agrarian economies, there is a wide range of social arrangements operated through the idea that 
peasants share a common subsistence ethic that forces each other to engage in a wide system of 
reciprocity to assure a minimum satisfaction of needs. Social insurance mechanisms such as forced 
generosity, communal land and work-sharing are thus present against ‘normal’ risks (i.e., family land 
to dry or to wet for resisting a harvest, breadwinner falling ill at transplanting or harvest time, etc.) 
though not for collective disasters through a system of social exchange and reciprocity (Scott, 1976).   3
migrants living abroad as former members, have a good knowledge of the process that 
leads to consumption outcomes. Even if they ignore the state of the world that will 
prevail in each point of time they can recognize welfare deteriorating conditions or 
events which could lead to future poverty and respond accordingly. Once the household 
specific estimates for future poverty are obtained we will look at the main features of 
transfers and those engaged in them in our sample. The next section will bring both 
pieces of information together to create various models on the incidence of transfers and 
their levels. The results of these models are then discussed before concluding. 
2 Vulnerability 
2.1 Definition 
Vulnerability in this work is understood as the magnitude of the threat of future poverty 
that a household experiences at a given point in time (Calvo and Dercon, 2005). This 
definition of vulnerability makes it different, but closely related to the concept of 
poverty. Poverty measures are generally fixed in time, making poverty itself essentially 
a static concept. By contrast, vulnerability here aims to identify households at risk of 
welfare shortfalls in the future based on their current standing. In this sense, it is an ex 
ante forward looking measure. The threat component in the definition alerts us about the 
centrality of risk. Given that risks refer to possibly occurring events that can damage 
well-being, it is their presence that is associated with a threat to welfare until they 
materialize or vanish. Finally, the threat of poverty is experienced in very different ways 
by each household, according to its own human and physical stock as well as the type of 
risks it faces. This leads to varying welfare circumstances across households that will be 
represented in the magnitude of the threat. Hence this magnitude is compounded by the 









   (1) 
where v(.) is a monotonic decreasing and convex function, z is a standard poverty line,  
c denotes the vector containing different states of the world for the relevant welfare 
outcome (in this case consumption per capita) and p is the probability of each occurring. 
ch = min (z,c) represents the standard characteristic of poverty measures under which 
values above the poverty line do not get any weight, in order to satisfy the focus 
axiom.4 By using ch we then ensure that c h has no effect on vulnerability when c>z. 
Therefore, xh becomes a ratio of coverage of minimal needs (assuming that z conveys a 
reliable monetary value of the cost of obtaining a basket of goods and services 
considered adequate to satisfy a group of basic needs) that takes values between 0 and 1 
and v(x) is its transformation to make it appropriate for the desired feature of an 
increase (decrease) in risk with its corresponding upward (downward) shift in 
                                                 
4   The focus axiom property requires concentrating only on those outcomes that are likely to be poverty 
threats.   4
vulnerability. Given the need to stress the role of risk in the vulnerability function one 
can rewrite (1) in the following way 
α
α h V (p, c, z) 1 E x , where 0< 1 α ⎡⎤ =− < ⎣⎦      (2) 
Here α can be interpreted as the coefficient of relative risk aversion, where xh is defined 
as before and takes the form of an exponential function to fulfil the condition of risk 
increasing when the mean value spreads from the middle to the tails. Therefore this 
normalized ratio of minimal needs obtained for each household by dividing total 
consumption per capita by the poverty line becomes adjusted by the risk aversion 
parameter. The expectations operator will summarize the weighted ratios by attaching 
probabilities to their occurrence. Finally, one minus this adjusted needs ratio transforms 
it into a monotonically decreasing convex function which achieves again the desired 
nature of risk-sensitivity in the measure of vulnerability.5 
2.2 Measurement 
From (2) one could break the estimation of vulnerability into two steps. First, and most 
importantly, one has to estimate an ex ante probability distribution of future 
consumption for each household E(Fc). This is because at the core of the notion of 
vulnerability lies the possibility that from the current standing of a household in time t, 
one could say something about its welfare prospects in t+1. This E(Fc) distribution will 
be formed by a series of potential consumption values (ch) which will provide the raw 
material for coming up with the desired outcome against which one could assess the 
welfare level of each household.  
Once the distribution of future consumption has been estimated, most of the decisions 
that will shape the form of the statistic created (Vα) come into effect. These choices 
could be taken at the outset but are only applied now. They include the definition of the 
consumption poverty line z along with the value of the risk aversion parameter for each 
household α.  
Considering we want to say something about future consumption starting from our 
baseline in October 1998, the full methodology (laid out in de la Fuente, 2005) allows 
us to end up with estimations for every household in both November 1999 and 2000. In 
Figure 2 we observe that the levels of vulnerability rose steadily throughout this 
interlude for most households, including those with relatively low levels of exposure to 
poverty threats, from an average level of vulnerability of 0.353 in November 1999 to 
0.366 by the end of 2000. 
 
                                                 
5   The measure of vulnerability presented at the individual level can be summed over all households to 
convey a measure of aggregate vulnerability in the following way: V(p, y, z) = Σi
n =1 Vi (p, y, z), 
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Figure 2  Vulnerability to Poverty
 
3 Data 
The main source of information for this paper comes from a group of 18,893 households 
located in 506 localities across seven states of Mexico: Guerrero, Hidalgo, Michoacán, 
Puebla, Querétaro, San Luis Potosí and Veracruz. They comprise some of the most 
deprived rural communities in the country and were set to be the prime target of the 
poverty alleviation Programme in Education, Health and Nutrition (Progresa and since 
2002  Oportunidades).6 A broader sample was initially surveyed in August 1997 
(Encuesta de Características Socioeconómicas de los Hogares or ENCASEH) at the 
onset of the programme to determine its beneficiaries. Subsequently, a series of socio-
economic household surveys (Encuesta de Evaluación de los Hogares or ENCEL) were 
carried out approximately every six months for a period of three years (from March 
1998 to November 2000) with the purpose of providing inputs for assessing the 
programme’s performance. These successive questionnaires plus a new round 
undertaken in March 2003 make up a total of seven rounds of information for the same 
group of households. These surveys were supplemented with questionnaires from the 
localities where households reside (Cuestionario de Localidad or ENCELLO).  
                                                 
6   Progresa was introduced in 1997 and re-launched as Oportunidades in 2002. Its basic objective is to 
improve the education, health and nutrition of poor families, particularly children and their mothers. 
In addition to nutrition supplements, it provides cash transfers to families in exchange for regular 
school attendance and visits to health posts. The payments are provided directly to mothers or the 
female head of households. The other major innovation of the programme is the creation of an 
evaluation sample through a randomization of villages into treatment and control groups, given the 
impossibility to start the provision of benefits everywhere simultaneously.   6
The ENCEL looks at households and their communities with great detail. For 
households, it provides information on expenditure and income levels, labour market 
participation and socio-demographic characteristics, asset ownership and family wealth, 
and even information on private transfers, including remittances between conationals. 
At the community level, it includes the socio-economic characteristics of localities, such 
as their access and distance to physical, health and educational public infrastructure. 
Furthermore, one can find information on health and weather related shocks and their 
impacts, both at the household and community levels. This level of comprehensiveness 
along with the fact that the same group of households are tracked over time make the 
ENCEL especially attractive for studying patterns of vulnerability in these communities. 
It was also decided to obtain and process a detailed account of rainfall records expressed 
on a monthly basis for a period of 40 years (from 1961 through 2000) coming from 
meteorological stations spread across the localities under study. We make use of the full 
rainfall distribution obtained to instrument our main variable of interest (i.e., 
vulnerability to poverty) as the proneness to future poverty might present a reciprocal 
causation with transfers. This is explained in full detail in Section 4. 
Despite its ample coverage of many topics, the ENCEL did not apply the same 
questions in each round of the survey. Each contains a common group of enquiries on 
the demographic composition of households and their socio-economic status, but many 
other questions were replaced by round-specific modules designed to capture other 
aspects of interest to policymakers. As a result, most of the seven waves of the 
household questionnaires have a core set of identical questions and a series of modules 
on different topics. This situation restricts comparison across rounds. In the end, the 
main data source for this paper will be three rounds of the ENCEL spaced one year 
apart (i.e., October 1998, November 1999 and November 2000) that contain detailed 
modules on private transfers. 
3.1 Transfers 
Each of the three rounds in the ENCEL contains data on different types of inter-
household transfers in two separate sections. The first asks if the household has received 
and/or given any type of support (cash, food, clothing, or work) in the last month, from 
and/or to relatives, friends or neighbours. A second section is devoted exclusively to 
permanent migrants. It enquires about any form of support received, but over the last six 
months, and only from those who had lived with the family and left within the five 
years prior to the survey date. In both sections, only cash transfers are given a monetary 
value. Likewise, both sections contain information on some characteristics of donors, 
including whether they live inside or outside the country. 
It should be said at this stage that we treat foreign remittances as part of the system of 
private transfers that prevails in these communities and therefore the analysis 
encompasses them unless it is stated otherwise. The place of origin of the transfer 
should not make any difference to our microlevel analysis of incidence because any 
possible distance factor hindering remittances has been blurred by the progressive 
access to wire transfer technologies by migrants in the US and the fact that their 
reception at the rural village could be in pesos. However, we do distinguish foreign 
remittances when considering the relevance that the levels of transfers have on future   7
poverty given that foreign migrants send more money on average than their domestic 
counterparts. 
Table 1 Incidence and levels of private transfers 
  October 1998  November 1999    November 2000 
  Total  T  C  Total   T  C    Total   T  C 
No. of observations  18892  11389  7503  18893  11388  7505    18888  11385  7503 
% households that               
Received transfer from anyone  10.62  10.47 10.9  8.63  8.45  8.9   7.88  7.95  7.78 
- from family  9.96  9.86  10.1  7.99 7.78 8.31    7.15 7.33 6.89 
- from friends  0.59  0.55  0.65  0.56 0.58 0.53    0.74 0.58 0.97 
- gave transfer to anyone  0.79  0.75  0.85 0.16  0.13  0.2   0.26  0.29  0.21 
% of households that gave or received               
- any type of transfer  11.22  11.04  11.5 8.77  8.57  9.07   8.08  8.15  7.97 
- monetary transfer  8.78  8.66  8.96 6.6  6.55  6.68   6.63  6.75  6.45 
- non-monetary transfer  3.06  2.99  3.18 2.57  2.37  2.87   1.68  1.62  1.79 
% of households that received from abroad               
- any type of transfer  2.57  2.54  2.62 2.13  1.99  2.35   2.81  2.82  2.8 
- monetary transfer  2.52  2.49  2.55 2.05  1.94  2.21   2.71  2.71  2.71 
- non-monetary transfer  0.14  0.14  0.13 0.16  0.11  0.24   0.15  0.16  0.13 
- gave transfer to anyone abroad  0  0  0  0  0  0    0.02  0.02  0 
               
  October 1998  November 1999    November 2000 
  Total  T  C  Total   T  C    Total   T  C 
No. of observations  18892  11389  7503  18893  11388  7505    18888  11385  7503 
Transfers received (as % of average consumption)                    
Over all households
1  2.92 4.75 7.37  3.06 4.88 8.03    3.95 6.52  10.15 
Conditional on transfers
2  34.27 31.84 37.93  50.88 47.04 57.01    62.41 58.46 68.76 
Transfers from abroad (as % of average consumption)                 
Over all households
2  1.60 2.61 4.12  1.86 2.97 4.93    2.26 3.63 5.65 
Conditional on transfers
3  61.38 58.65 65.60  92.78 83.67  106.46   84.07  80.99  88.97 
Notes:  
1All changes significant at 1%, except between Oct. 1998 and Nov. 2000. 
 
2All changes significant at 1%, except between Oct. 1998 and Nov. 1999. 
 
3Only change significant at 1% is between Oct. 1998 and Nov. 2000. 
 T=treatment  C=control   
 
For the construction of the private transfer variables, we aggregated all individual 
information into the household. Since any transfer comprises both its activation and the 
actual level mobilized, we first created a dummy that takes a value of one if any 
monetary or non-monetary transfer had been received. Second, we calculated the net 
level of transfers exchanged. This is almost equivalent to the amount of transfers 
received, as the percentage of households giving support back is negligible. To   8
construct this variable we summed the information regarding inward and outward 
transfers given by or to outsiders over the previous month, adjusting the permanent 
migrant’s remittances to a monthly basis for comparability. Some double counting of 
transfers is possible since those permanent migrants who provided a transfer could be 
the same relatives that reported giving away in the last month. The transfer levels 
variable was thus constructed as an aggregate of the two sections referred to above, 
netting out double counting as others have done previously (Teruel and Davis, 2000). 
Overall, the proportion of families receiving transfers or, more generally, reporting 
transactions, gradually drops over the course of the three years. This could have been 
caused by a response bias originated by respondents in the treatment groups that were 
afraid that they would stop receiving benefits, or no longer qualify for them in the case 
of control groups which led to underreporting. The amounts transferred followed the 
reverse trend, with their incidence increasing every year as shown in Table 1.  
3.1.1 Going to the neediest? 
As initially stated, we were tempted to consider the existence of national and 
transnational support networks as something common and widespread in these villages 
given that agricultural activities in poor rural areas are more vulnerable to shocks and 
formal institutions for risk management less developed. However, if the rates of 
transfers exchanged between households were indicative of the support networks 
available in these communities, these would be surprisingly low. As Table 1 illustrates, 
only about one in every ten households reported giving or receiving any type of transfer 
during October 1998 and this decreased in the following two years. This low figure 
could be a consequence of the questionnaire design, as the report period for transfers 
from friends, neighbours and relatives considers only one month prior to the survey. 
However, it could also mean that even if poor households usually get involved in 
networks, their low resource bases or other factors not visible to us make support 
unlikely. In addition, most of the exchanges reported by friends, neighbours and 
relatives are one way transactions with less than one per cent of households giving any 
type of transfer in October 1998 and an even smaller proportion in the following two 
years. This adds to our suspicion that transfers do not always reach those in most need, 
as there seems to be a negligible flow of resources from better to worse off households 
within the same locality.  
From the household’s welfare point of view, it also seems that transfers are not going to 
the poorest members in these communities. Table 2 disaggregates our vulnerability 
estimates by quartiles to show that those facing the least threat of future poverty (lower 
quartiles) are better endowed, and receive more and higher levels of transfers. In both 
years, for instance, the share of households receiving foreign remittances in the first 
quartile is more than four times those in the top quartile. The same trend is reproduced 
for transfers overall. In November 1999, almost one fifth of the least vulnerable 
households received grants, while that proportion reached only five per cent among the 
more vulnerable (highest quartile). Similarly, in November 2000, the share of 
households receiving transfers in the lowest quartile is more than three times those in 
the fourth quartile.    9
Table 2 Vulnerability to poverty by quartiles 
  VTP November 1999  VTP November 2000 
  1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4 
Consumption per capita $  327.22 225.85 176.98 136.47 323.55  227.49 178.03 138.44
Household size #  2.98  4.37  5.69 7.58  3.16 4.36 5.63 7.47 
Dependency ratio %  0.70  0.91  1.19 1.46  0.71 0.91 1.18 1.46 
Female head %  0.21  0.12  0.08 0.05  0.20 0.12 0.08 0.06 
Head is widow %  0.21  0.11  0.07 0.05  0.20 0.11 0.07 0.05 
Head is wage labourer %  0.48  0.56 0.60 0.61  0.48 0.56 0.60 0.61 
Working members at home %  0.41  0.33 0.28 0.24  0.41 0.33 0.28 0.24 
Asset index  0.29  0.27  0.24 0.20  0.30 0.26 0.23 0.19 
Cattle #  0.93  0.66  0.55  0.48  1.04 0.60 0.55 0.44 
Avg. schooling of household migrants # 8.98 9.28 9.21 9.14  9.17 9.21 9.11 9.08 
Has received a transfer %  0.17  0.08 0.06 0.05  0.16 0.09 0.06 0.05 
Has received domestic transfer %  0.12 0.06 0.04 0.04  0.11 0.07 0.04 0.04 
Has received foreign transfer %  0.05 0.02 0.02 0.01  0.05 0.02 0.02 0.01 
Net level of transfer $  65.72  26.79 19.16 16.89  65.67 28.17 19.14 15.59 
Net level of domestic transfer $  30.96 10.38  6.66  5.98  29.77 12.25  5.98  5.97 
Net level of foreign transfer $  34.29 16.24 12.20 10.78  35.46 15.57 13.13  9.35 
Note:   All monetary amounts expressed in August 1998 pesos ($). 
 
 
3.1.2 Where do transfers go and where do they come from? 
In Table 3 we observe that transfers regardless of their place of origin tend to go to 
smaller households with fewer children and more elders and to families with few 
working adult members but more permanent migrants. Widow female headed 
households are one of the main groups reached by private transfers.  
On the other hand, having a permanent migrant seems to have great relevance for 
recipient families. By far the main contingent that leave home are the offspring. As 
Tables 4 and 5 prove, most of them domestically and internationally leave unmarried 
and for working purposes, especially the later group. Migrating daughters stay closer to 
their homes than sons, who more often migrate to the United States. Finally, male 
foreign migrants are more likely to provide support than females, and this is done 
mostly in cash, and in higher amounts. In the case of international remittances there is 
also a gradual increase in the amount of remittances sent back home, which corresponds 
with the national trends observed between 1998 and 2000.  
   10
Table 3 Household characteristics by receipt of transfers 









Consumption per capita $  304.79  226.96 242.00  197.90 271.21  207.71 
Household size #  3.99  5.55 4.05  5.45 3.52  5.16 
Children 0–5 #  0.53  1.03 0.42  0.81 0.89  1.17 
Male 6–14 #  0.54  0.78 0.56  0.75 0.51  0.77 
Female 6–14 #  0.49  0.76 0.52  0.72 0.51  0.75 
Male 15–64 #  1.12  1.52 0.94  1.43 1.13  1.60 
Female 15–64 #  1.26  1.52 1.08  1.44 1.27  1.61 
Male >65 #  0.28  0.14 0.23  0.15 0.35  0.17 
Female >65 #  0.32  0.13 0.30  0.14 0.40  0.15 
Head age #  64.54  49.74 64.92  51.41 69.07  52.48 
Head female %  0.39  0.13 0.39  0.15 0.42  0.17 
Head is widow %  0.39  0.14 0.44  0.17 0.50  0.17 
Head is agricultural labourer %  0.34  0.59  0.35 0.57  0.24 0.54 
Head in non-agriculture % 0.04  0.07  0.04  0.08 0.03  0.08 
Working members at home %  0.30 0.32  0.26 0.32 0.22  0.31 
Asset index  0.21  0.21 0.15  0.25 0.24  0.26 
Household has a migrant %  0.58 0.13  0.56 0.14 0.43  0.12 
 FOREIGN 
Consumption per capita $  329.83  230.77 325.29  198.08 331.17  207.54 
Household size #  4.74  5.44 4.28  5.38 4.55  5.09 
Children 0–5 #  0.58  1.00 0.41  0.79 1.23  1.15 
Male 6–14 #  0.66  0.77 0.54  0.75 0.67  0.76 
Female 6–14 #  0.65  0.74 0.54  0.71 0.62  0.74 
Male 15–64 #  1.35  1.50 0.89  1.41 1.76  1.57 
Female 15–64 #  1.52  1.50 1.41  1.42 1.84  1.58 
Male >65 #  0.27  0.15 0.27  0.15 0.23  0.18 
Female >65 #  0.24  0.14 0.23  0.14 0.21  0.17 
Head age #  61.43  51.23 64.26  52.40 58.11  53.79 
Head female %  0.26  0.16 0.28  0.18 0.33  0.19 
Head is widow %  0.30  0.17 0.38  0.19 0.32  0.20 
Head is agricultural labourer %  0.33  0.57  0.27 0.56  0.22 0.53 
Head in non-agriculture % 0.08  0.07  0.05  0.07 0.03  0.08 
Working members at home %  0.31 0.32  0.23 0.31 0.23  0.31 
Asset index  0.39  0.21 0.44  0.23 0.49  0.25 
Household has a migrant %  0.73 0.15  0.69 0.16 0.81  0.12 
Note.   Monetary amounts expressed in August 1998 pesos ($). 
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Table 4 Characteristics of domestic permanent migrants 
  October 1998  October 1999  November 2000 
Variable Total  Male  Female  Total  Male Female Total Male    Female 
Households w/domestic migrants %  81.47      77.45      70.56     
(over those w/permanent migrants)                   
Households w/domestic migrants %  13.26      13.09      9.88     
(over  all  households)              
Domestic  migrants  #  4566  2191 2375 4784  2210 2574 4140  1953 2187 
Civil status at departure  Obs.  4297  2060 2237 4234  1945 2289 3984  1882 2102 
Unmarried  %  74.5  71.6 72.3 67.8 67.8  67.8  66.4 66.4  66.8 
Married  15.9  18.7 13.2 17.5  18.2 16.9 29.4  23.4 22.2 
Cohabitation 6.5  7.7  5.5  10.6 11.4  9.9  6.6 7.3  6.0 
Separated 1.6  1.3  1.9  2.2 1.4  2.9  1.6 1.1  2.2 
Widowed 1.2  0.6  1.8  1.8 1.2  2.3  2.2 1.7  2.6 
Kinship with head  Obs.  4404  2109 2295 4699  2167 2532 4115  1935 2180 
Son/daughter %  88.0  88.9  87.3 72.1  73.2 71.2 64.2 67.3  61.3 
Husband/wife or partner  0.9  1.5 0.3 1.3  2.0 0.8 2.2  3.1 1.4 
Brother/sister 1.6  1.8  1.5  2.6 3.8  2.2  3.8 4.1  3.4 
Son/daughter-in-law 2.1  0.9  3.2 5.8  2.5 8.6 6.5  2.4  10.1 
Niece 3.9  3.9  3.9  10.9  11.5 10.3 11.0  10.7 11.3 
Nephew 0.9  1.0  0.7  2.2 2.5  2.0  2.9 3.0  2.9 
Reason for leaving home  Obs.  4533  2169 2364 4740  2189 2551 4020  1893 2127 
Work  %  46.2  55.6 37.5 37.2 43.7  31.7  37.7 47.5  29.0 
Got  married  32.9  23.9 41.1 27.9 20.6  34.1  25.0 15.9  33.1 
Study 6.2  6.3  6.1  5.3  5.6 5.0 2.7  3.1 2.4 
Problems 2.5  2.5  2.5  3.1 3.1  3.1  3.5 3.7  3.4 
Other  12.33  11.8 12.8 26.6  27.1 26.2 31.0  29.8 32.0 
Type of support  Obs.  4322  2073 2249 4265  1956 2309 4124  1944 2180 
No support provided %  73.2  68.9  77.1 86.7  83.7 89.1 88.5  86.4 90.4 
Cash  22.2  26.5 18.3 12.5  15.2  10.3 9.1  11.4 7.1 
In kind  3.6  3.6  3.4  0.6 0.6  0.6  2.0 1.8  2.3 
Transfer  Obs.  937  403 534 522  286 236 374  220 154 
(over those persons that sent)  $  572 535  600 1013  1100 908 1119  1247 935 
Transfer  Obs.  4562  2188 2374 4769  2203 2566 4113  1944 2169 
(over all domestic migrants) $  117  146  91  111  142  83  101  140  66   12
Table 5 Characteristics of permanent migrants abroad 
  October 1998  October 1999  November 2000 
Variable Total  Male  Female  Total  Male Female Total Male    Female 
Households w/domestic migrants %  16.48      15.69      25.83     
(over those w/permanent migrants)                    
Households w/domestic migrants %  2.68      2.65      3.61     
(over  all  households)              
Migrants  abroad  #  749  563 186 747  555 192  1027  774 253 
Residence (all migrants)    Obs.  5315  2754 2561 6092  3020 3072 5167  2727 2440 
Same locality  22.7  21.3  24.2  19.9 18.8  20.9  27.8 23.9  32.2 
Nearby locality  7.1  4.0  10.5 8.0 5.9 10.3 6.2 4.4  8.1 
Same municipality  5.1  3.4  6.9 5.3  3.8 6.7 4.4 3.1  5.8 
Same state  13.9  11.6  16.3  14.0 11.5  15.7  11.7 10.7  12.8 
Another state  36.2  38.2 33.9 31.7  33.2 30.2 30.1  29.5 30.7 
Another country  14.1  20.4  7.3 12.0  18.4 6.3 19.9 28.4  10.4 
Civil status at departure    Obs.  738  553 184 720  539 181  1017  767 250 
Unmarried %  80.5  82.3  75.0  72.1 72.0  72.4  71.6 71.8  70.8 
Married   13.7  12.3  17.9  21.3 21.9  19.3  22.8 23.2  21.6 
Cohabitation 3.0  3.1  2.7  3.8 3.7  3.9  3.9 3.7  4.8 
Separated 1.4  1.3  1.6  2.1 1.9  2.8  0.8 0.5  1.6 
Widowed 1.5  1.1  2.7  0.8 0.6  1.7  0.8 0.8  0.8 
Kinship with head    Obs.  726  541 185 721  533 188  1022  769 253 
Son/daughter %  92.2  91.7  93.5 86.6  86.7 86.2 75.0 76.7  69.6 
Husband/wife or partner  2.9  3.7 0.5 4.6  5.6 1.6 10.4  13.5 0.8 
Brother/Sister 1.5  1.9  0.5  0.6 0.8  0.0  1.2 0.8  2.4 
Son/daughter-in-law 1.1  0.7  2.2 2.5  1.5 0.0 3.7  1.4  10.7 
Niece 1.0  0.9  1.1  2.8  3.0 5.3 6.2  4.7  10.7 
Nephew   0.6  0.7  0.0  0.8 0.9  2.1  0.7 0.5  1.2 
Reason for leaving home    Obs.  747  562 185 744  554 190  1014  764 250 
Work %  81.8  88.8  60.5  82.3 89.7  60.5  79.5 88.4  52.4 
Got married  13.8  6.8  35.1  9.5 4.2 25.3 9.1 3.4 26.4 
Study 2.3  2.3  2.2  2.4  1.8 4.2 2.4  2.8 1.2 
Problems 0.5  0.5  0.5  0.3 0.4  0.0  0.4 0.5  0.0 
Other   1.6  1.6  1.6  5.5 4.0 10.0 8.7 5.0 20.0 
Type of support    Obs.  738  553 185 723  540 183  1016  764 252 
No support provided %  45.5  40.3  61.1 57.4  53.7 68.3 53.4  45.7 77.0 
Cash 53.4  59.0  36.8  42.3  46.3 30.6 44.4  52.2 20.6 
In kind  0.3  0.2  0.5  0.0 0.0  0.0  2.0 2.0  2.0 
Transfer   Obs.  391  324 67 303  248 55 437  387 50 
(over those persons that sent) $  1892  1973 1499 3924  3637 5216 4085  4217 3058 
Transfer  Obs.  749  563 186 742  551 191  1027  774 253 
(over all migrants abroad)  998  1136  540  1592  1625  1494  1738  2109  604   13
4 Econometric  estimation 
The relationship between an increase in the risk of future poverty (VTP) for households 
and their prospects for receiving support from others will be addressed formally by 
adopting the following specification 
T h, t = a + bX h, t + b2 R h, t + b3(VTP) h, t+1 + e h, t      (3) 
where T is a latent variable that results from an unobserved continuous process that 
determines the propensity to receive transfers and takes positive values if the transfer is 
received. In (3) if T>0 then the transfers received take a value of one whereas if T<=0, 
the transfers observed take the value of zero. X is a vector of household controls that 
could affect the incidence and level of grants obtained. We contemplate several features 
of the household head; the ratio between dependent and working age members, the 
percentage of working household members and if the household reported to have any 
permanent migrants; some asset endowments such as land hectares possessed and cattle 
units; and finally, public transfers from different government programs.7 R is a vector of 
dummies that contains multiple impacts from weather related shocks (i.e., destruction or 
loss of physical and human capital in the form of land, crops, animals, items or home, or 
if any member from the family died, got injured or migrated to look for more promising 
economic opportunities elsewhere) and health shocks (i.e., the number of productive 
days lost by the breadwinner due to illness) as well as the number of sick children 
reported by households. As usual, the error term e is assumed to be normally 
distributed. Our main regressor is the vulnerability score to future consumption poverty 
of each household (VTP). On a purely normative ground, if our coefficient of interest b3 
turns out positive (b3>0), it would indicate that the need for mutual insurance which an 
increase in vulnerability would require would be compensated for by a higher 
probability of receiving transfers. Given our current dataset, this specification translates 
into a model of the incidence of transfers for those already poor in October 1998 given 
the possibility of staying poor or becoming poor(er) in November 1999, as well as the 
incidence for November 1999 given the likelihood of staying poor or becoming poor(er) 
a year after.  
However, such a specification could pose endogeneity problems between the dependent 
variable and our main regressor VTP. By definition, the future welfare outcome used for 
the computation of vulnerability takes into account both negative and positive shocks, 
including public and private transfers. It would therefore be difficult to detect what 
effect increasing the risk of future poverty could have on receiving more private 
transfers. 
The proposed solution is to obtain the relevant parameters through an Instrumental 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation Probit model on the probability of receiving a 
transfer. We circumvent the problem of endogeneity through the identification of proper 
instruments for VTP that would purge its correlation with the residual eh. The 
                                                 
7   Table 2 shows that the average years of education for migrant household members across vulnerability 
quartiles are similar. We find no reason to control for this poverty trap effect in which remittances to 
more vulnerable families could be lower due to the fact that more vulnerable families were poorer in 
the usual sense and that both poorer families and their migrant members had lower levels of human 
and social capital (so their migrant members earned less and hence had less to remit).   14
endogenous variable VTP would be regressed upon such set of instruments and fit into 
the full Probit model; in other words, once instrumented VTP will be used as an 
explanatory variable in the private transfer equation to compute the relevant parameters.  
The selected instruments consist of the standard deviation of the aforementioned 
absolute rainfall distribution as well as the bottom 20th percentile of the same rainfall 
distribution alone and interacted with the amount of cattle and land possessed by the 
household and the percentage of working members at home. The measures of central 
tendency and dispersion derived from the absolute rainfall distribution could inform 
about the dispersion of future consumption provided shocks materialize. Rainfall related 
events, for example a drought, would lead to fluctuations away from the mean given 
their high level of aggregation, as well as the relatively extended lack of insurance 
against them in rural areas. Moreover, it would be hardly credible that precipitation 
levels hold a contemporary correlation with the likelihood of receiving any form of 
private transfer making them a completely exogenous event. On the other hand, the 
cattle and land household controls are particularly sensitive to weather related shocks 
and the labour force potentially helpful to cope with them. All three are included 
because they can reveal part of the more stable component of the future welfare 
outcome employed (i.e., future consumption). Overall, this group of variables should 
inform us about the distribution of vulnerability. More importantly, after some testing 
reported in the following section we are able to confirm that they fulfil the conditions 
that make for a good instrument, that is, they are correlated with the endogenous 
regressor and uncorrelated with the residuals from equation (3) (Deaton, 1997).  
Given that a transfer indeed occurs, we next consider if the amount received by the 
household increases or decreases given a rise in the possibility of it becoming poorer in 
the future. This involves a model specification where the latent variable T still takes 
discrete choice values of zero for those unobserved remittances, but positive values for 
those households that actually receive remittances, making t>=0. X and R are the same 
control vectors as before, and v is the truncated distribution of residuals.   
t h, t = a + bX h, t + b2 R h, t + b3(VTP) h, t+1 + E[v h, t | t h>0]   (4) 
We believe there are no reasons to find differentiated effects on the probability of both 
receiving grants as well as the amount obtained. Hence, we considered a Tobin’s Probit 
model to be an appropriate estimation strategy to account for the potential bias that 
arises from the truncation of t at zero. 
5 Results 
Our statistical analysis suggested that the remission of money or in-kind support does 
not appear to end up with those who are more likely to be needy in the future. Our 
econometric approach also reported an inverse and significant relationship between the 
probability of receiving a transfer and experiencing an increase in the risk of future 
poverty. To arrive at this conclusion, we first carried out a Probit on the incidence of 
domestic and foreign transfers alike. As columns (2) and (4) in Table 6 show at the 
bottom (non-instrumented vulnerability to poverty in t+1), there is a significant and 
negative association between the increase in vulnerability of the rural poor across our 
sample of households and the remittance of transfers to them. Given that those at the   15
upper end of the distribution face a higher risk of future poverty we chose to report the 
marginal effects at the 75th percentile. 
To reinforce our conclusion and strengthen our econometric estimation, we accounted 
for possible sources of endogeneity by instrumenting the variable that could have a 
reciprocal causation with the outcome variable (i.e., the relationship between 
vulnerability to poverty and the reception of transfers). The rejection of exogeneity at 99 
per cent and 95 per cent confidence levels in October 1998 and November 1999, 
respectively, suggested that we should proceed along these lines to try to get some 
consistent estimates. Columns (1) and (3) display the results of the instrumental 
variables regression. We confirmed that the instruments are all individually and jointly 
significant and behave as expected. For instance, records at the bottom tail of the 
rainfall distribution for our group of localities increase the magnitude of the household 
threat of future poverty, but fluctuations away from the average level of the absolute 
rainfall distribution, if positive, could reduce the vulnerability of households through 
more precipitation. In a similar vein, the interaction of negative fluctuations on locality 
precipitation with rainfall related risk-sensitive assets such as land and cattle also tends 
to augment such exposure. On the contrary, the possible impact on vulnerability of 
droughts might be attenuated by an increased labour availability at home. The results in 
the first row of columns (2) and (4) represent our Probit model on the incidence of 
transfers after correcting for endogeneity. We obtained the same result as our non-
instrumented Probit displayed in the bottom row of Table 2, that is, our fundamental 
claim regarding the negative relationship between remittances and vulnerability to 
poverty in this sample of rural households remains. 
Finally, in accordance with our statistical exploration, households with more dependent 
members – especially elder people – whose head is female, elderly, and with permanent 
migrants are more likely to receive transfers. In contrast, those where the head is 
involved in agricultural wage labour and with more working members at home are less 
likely to obtain inflows from others.   16
Table 6 Effect of correlates on the incidence of private transfers 
t =  October 1998  November 1999 
 IV  Probit 
(dF/dx) 
IV Probit   
(dF/dx) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Instrumented vulnerability to poverty in t+1    -0.233    -0.143 
   (0.021)***    (0.024)*** 
Rainfall distribution (Std dev.)  -0.000  -0.000  
  (0.000)   (0.000)***   
Rainfall distribution (20th p%)  0.002  0.002  
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  
# Land ha * rainfall 20th p%  0.000  0.000  
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  
# Cattle * rainfall 20th p%  0.000  0.000  
  (0.000)   (0.000)***   
Working household members * rainfall 20th p%  -0.001  -0.001  
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  
Household size  0.043 0.003 0.044 0.002 
  (0.000)*** (0.001)** (0.000)***  (0.002) 
Dependency ratio  0.018 0.008 0.017 0.004 
  (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
% Working household members  -0.045 -0.049 -0.030 -0.059 
  (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** 
Head age  -0.003 0.003 -0.002 0.002 
  (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** 
Female head   -0.029 0.007 -0.024 0.007 
  (0.003)*** (0.004)* (0.003)*** (0.004)* 
Head schooling  -0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.000 
  (0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000)*** (0.000) 
Head is agricultural wage labourer  0.008 -  0.007 0.019 -0.006 
  (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)** 
Head works in non-agricultural activity  -0.103 -0.007 0.003 -0.006 
  (0.003)*** (0.003)**  (0.003)  (0.003)* 
Land hectares  -0.000 0.000 -0.004 -0.001 
  (0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000)*** (0.000) 
Number of cattle  -0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.001 
  (0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000)*** (0.000) 
Household has a migrant  -0.003 0.206 0.019 0.222 
  (0.002) (0.015)***  (0.002)***  (0.009)*** 
      
Non-instrumented vulnerability to poverty in t+1    -0.140  -0.075 
   (0.011)***  (0.010)*** 
Observations  15574 15574 15465 15465   17
Amemiya-Lee-Newey test  P-value = 0.0008    P-value = 0.0141 
Wald test of exogeneity  P-value = 0.0001  P-value = 0.0143 
Notes:   (Standard errors). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Marginal Effects 
(dF/dx) reported at the 75th percentile. Other regressors included are whether households 
obtained resources from various government programmes and dummies for health and weather 
related shock impacts.  
  Non-instrumented vulnerability to poverty is the same Probit model without correcting for 
endogeneity. The rest of the marginal effects for this Probit are not reported in the table. 
 
The OLS and Tobit estimates on transfer levels convey the same conclusion: an increase 
in the risk of future poverty translates into a reduction in the level of transfers received 
(detailed results are available upon request). As Figure 3 illustrates this is clearly driven 
by foreign remittances. The negative trends of fitted values for foreign remittances 
(made in October 1998 and November 1999) for the instrumented index of vulnerability 
to poverty (for November 1999 and 2000, respectively) were more pronounced than 
those of general remittances. In both years, most values are comprised between the first 
and third quartiles as the indices follow a slightly positively skewed normal distribution 
as shown in Figure 2. As households move to higher levels of risk the decline in the 
level of grants observed becomes steeper. A non-marginal shift from the 25th percentile 
of the distribution to the 75th percentile, though unlikely, would translate into a decline 
of approximately $140 pesos (US$14) in October 1998 and $100 pesos (US$10) in 
November 1999 for remittances in general, but $900 pesos (US$90) and $1300 pesos 
(US$130) for foreign, respectively. 
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International remittances have been perceived as the human face of globalization 
especially through their potential effects on poverty as they directly increase the 
household’s level of income and therefore should become a massive poverty reduction 
mechanism if targeted on deprived households. However, even though mutual support 
networks of relatives and friends are meant to be one of the most important resources 
that poor rural households can draw upon to cope with problems by providing risk-
pooling mechanisms in the absence or limited access to formal credit and insurance 
markets (Bando and López-Calva, 2004), their activation might not necessarily be 
aligned to the needs and risks faced by recipients. 
Given that remittances have reached historically high flows in Mexico in the recent past 
becoming one of the most salient features that have taken place in the country under the 
mantra of globalization we therefore considered of most relevance to understand 
whether transfers, including international remittances, indeed reach those whose 
conditions are likely to worsen in the future. 
We addressed this question by creating a model that would allow us to predict future 
consumption expenditures based on current household socio-demographic 
characteristics, as well as risk-mitigating assets. This resulted in differentiated levels of 
vulnerability to poverty for a panel of rural households in Mexico that extends from 
October 1998 to November 2000. After coming up with such levels for each household, 
we brought into a series of Probit and Tobit models to discern if an increase in the risk 
of future consumption poverty automatically translated into a higher probability for 
receiving help from others, including those living abroad. Caution was paid to   19
reciprocal causation by instrumenting through monthly rainfall data the possible source 
of endogeneity contained in our vulnerability regressor. 
We found with statistical significance that an increase in the threat to future poverty that 
rural families could experience reduces their likelihood of receiving transfers, including 
foreign remittances. We did not enquire as to why this could be the case as this would 
demand more information about migrant households themselves which was not 
available, such as the migrants’ earnings and other important personal characteristics. 
Certainly this remains a line of research worth exploring in the future. On a more 
speculative ground, even though pure altruistic considerations to send remittances 
cannot be fully discarded, a highly asymmetrical relationship seems to pervade the 
relationship between donors and recipients in our sample leaving the migrant with few 
incentives to abide by a mutual arrangement. As a result, a reduced probability for 
private transfers to reach households that experience an increase in the risk of future 
poverty could be the outcome of a highly skewed insurance arrangement where the 
migrant applies an exit option because it perceives no further incentives or gains for 
staying in it. 
Facilitating foreign remittances, or more generally, private transfers, for rural recipients 
should not be considered a safety valve against poverty nor a substitute for the 
introduction of publicly funded schemes of social protection coupled with the gradual 
improvement of economic conditions in the home villages that could encourage young 
people to stay, and parents to stop making costly and high risk investments on their 
behalf. 
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